Abstract. In response to the problems that have arisen regarding the terminology and concepts of agent-oriented systems, previous work has described a formal framework for understanding agency and autonomy. In particular, this work made the claim that the framework could serve as a vehicle for the precise presentation and evaluation of models and theories of multi-agent systems. We support this claim by outlining the framework and re ning it through adding further levels of detail to formalise the concepts of external descriptions and social dependence networks. Social Dependence Networks are a valuable source of information about the relationships within a multi-agent world. They allow agents to reason about the resources and capabilities of others in order that they may enter into a negotiation to persuade these others to assist them in completing their tasks. By formalising social dependence networks within the framework we are able to identify de ciencies in the original characterisation of the networks and the external descriptions of agents within them. We address these de ciencies, and o er a modi ed view which removes much of the ambiguity and presents a stronger and more consistent formal model. In reformulating these networks in this way, we also present a case study which shows how the formal framework that has been previously developed can be applied to provide an environment in which we can describe and reason about theories and models of multi-agent systems.
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Introduction
There is a growing recognition within the multi-agent system (MAS) community of the need to harmonise the e orts being made in di erent sub-elds and so derive a well-de ned discipline of MAS 15] . Previously, we have developed a principled theory of agency and autonomy through the provision of a formal framework which de nes these concepts and speci es the relationship between them 8]. This framework was an attempt to provide strong de nitions, not only to be precise about the meaning of terms which often have an ambiguous interpretation, but also to serve as an environment in which theories and models of multi-agents systems can be presented, evaluated and developed. In this paper we illustrate how this can be done by adding detail to the framework to describe social dependence networks (SDN) 12]. Specifying SDNs formally in this way has allowed us to note inconsistencies and ambiguities in the work and suggest possibilities for its development as a useful mechanism for social agents.
As stated elsewhere 8], in the current work, we have adopted the speci cation language Z 14] for two major reasons. First, it provides modularity and abstraction and is su ciently expressive to allow a consistent, uni ed and structured account of a computer system and its associated operations. Such structured speci cations enable the description of systems at di erent levels of abstraction, with system complexity being added at successively lower levels. Second, we view our enterprise as that of building programs. Z schemas are particularly suitable in squaring the demands of formal modelling with the need for implementation by providing clear and unambiguous de nitions of state and operations on state which provide a basis for program development. Thus our approach to formal speci cation is pragmatic | we need to be formal to be precise about the concepts we discuss, yet we want to remain directly connected to issues of implementation. Z provides just those qualities that are needed, and is increasingly being used for specifying frameworks and systems in AI 6, 3, 11] and related areas 4, 5] .
The paper begins with a brief description of Social Dependence Networks 12], and continues with a very short outline of the agent hierarchy speci ed previously 8]. The next section extends and re nes the speci cation of the agent hierarchy to specify SDNs formally. This allows us to evaluate and reason about these mechanisms in terms of our formal framework. We then develop and propose a re ned model of dependence networks based on our notions of agency and autonomy. Lastly, we draw conclusions made from this case study of applying the framework we have developed.
External Descriptions and Dependence Networks
Dependence networks 12] are structures that form the basis of a computational model of Social Power Theory 1, 2]. They allow agents to reason about, and understand, the collective group of agents that make up the multi-agent world in which they operate. This section introduces dependence networks and external descriptions, data structures used to store information about other agents, based on the work reported by Sichman et al. 12] .
External descriptions store information about other agents, and comprise a set of goals, actions, resources and plans for each such agent. The goals are those an agent wants to achieve, the actions are those an agent is able to perform, the resources are those over which an agent has control, and the plans are those available to the agent, but using actions and resources which are not necessarily available to the agent. This means that one agent may depend on another in terms of actions or resources in order for a plan to be executed.
An agent i is denoted by ag i , and any such agent has a set of external descriptions of all of the other agents in the world, denoted by
where Ext ag i (ag j ) def fG ag i (ag j ); A ag i (ag j ); R ag i (ag j ); P ag i (ag j )g such that G ag i (ag j ) is the set of goals, A ag i (ag j ) is the set of actions, R ag i (ag j ) is the set of resources, and P ag i (ag j ) is the set of plans that agent i believes agent j has. Notice that an agent has a model of itself as well as others. The authors adopt what they call the hypothesis of external description compatibility which states that any two agents will have precisely the same external description of any other agent. This is stated as follows.
Ext ag i (ag i ) = Ext ag j (ag i )^Ext ag i (ag j ) = Ext ag j (ag j ) Now, P ag i (ag j ; g k ) represents the set of plans that agent i believes that agent j has in order to achieve the goal g k . Each plan within this set is given by p ag i l , de ned below: p ag i l (ag j ; g k ) def fg k ; R(p ag i l (ag j ; g k )); I (p ag i l (ag j ; g k ))g where R(p ag i l ) represents the set of resources required for the plan and I (p ag i l ) is a sequence of instantiated actions used in this plan. Each instantiated action within a plan is de ned by the action itself and the set of resources used in the instantiation of this action:
def fa m ; R am (p ag i l (ag j ; g k ))g
Note that this makes the de nition of the resources of a plan redundant: if you know the resources required by each action within a plan, then you must also know the set of all the resources required by the plan.
An Overview of the Framework for Agency and Autonomy
Before we can attempt to reformulate the work described above in a broader formal framework, we must rst provide an overview of that framework, speci ed in Z. Our basic component is an entity 10 ]. An entity consists of four constituents as follows: a set of attributes, which are perceivable qualities of the entity; a set of actions, which de ne the basic capabilities of the agent; a set of goals, which are the goals that can be ascribed to the entity which characterise its agency; and a set of internal non-derivable motivations which de ne an entity's autonomy. Using this schema we can de ne certain categories of entity. In particular, an object is any entity with a non-empty set of capabilities, an agent is any object with a non-empty set of goals, and an autonomous agent is any agent with a non-empty set of motivations. A full treatment of the framework which has subsequently been re ned and developed in a number of ways can be found in 10]. A model of how goals are generated by motivated agents (which we take to be the de ning quality of autonomy), and subsequently adopted by non-autonomous agents has been constructed 9]. We have also shown how certain social structures | cooperation between autonomous agents, and engagements of non-autonomous agents | arise as a result of such goal generation and adoption 7].
In addition, we can easily re ne components within the framework to provide, for example, a high level speci cation of an autonomous planning agent. Consider the next schema which describes such a re nement. A planning agent is an agent with a set of plans associated with a set of goals. Each plan in the set is a possible means of bringing about the associated goal. Some subset of these goals are ones that the agent currently desires; it might have plans for a goal it does not currently desire. We de ne a complete plan to be a sequence of actions. (There are, certainly, other types of plan, but this will be su cient for the presentation of SDNs in this paper.) Plan The schema states that all the plans of an agent must be associated with a goal, although it may be that the set of plans associated with a goal is the empty set. It might also be that a plan brings about more than one goal of the planning agent.
By using this framework, speci ed in Z, as a basis for reformulating the model of SDNs, we can provide a clear and unambiguous formal model, and highlight some of the potential ambiguities which arise within the existing model. We take actions, goals and plans in the original model to be actions, goals and plans in the Z framework. We take a resource to mean some entity | an object, agent or autonomous agent.
External Descriptions
To deal with an external description, we must re ne our de nition of a simple planning agent by including three additional variables. The rst, ownedresources, represents the set of resources which an agent owns. The second, instsreq, models the set of resources needed to instantiate an action within a plan. The third, redundant variable, resourcesofplan, is included for readability and records the total set of resources required by a plan.
There are two predicates in the lower part of the schema which relate the variables in the schema as follows: stripping the set of entities away from each instantiated action gives the original plan; and the resources of a plan are the union of each set of entities associated with each action of the plan. Now, since every external description of an agent is the same, we can model the formalism very simply. An agent, A, has associated with it an external description which is precisely the model that every agent (including agent A) has of agent A (according to the hypothesis of external description compatibility).
World extdes : Agent ExternalDescription
Then, according to the external description of some agent, i, (extdes i):plans is its set of plans, (extdes i):capableof is its set of actions, (extdes i):ownedresources is its set of resources and (extdes i):goals is its set of goals.
Discussion There are several di culties that become apparent when the SDN model is reformulated in this way. First of all, the distinction between a resource and an agent is not clear. For example, is a benevolent agent, who will always adopt the goals of another, a resource or an agent? It seems that some arbitrary distinction, presumably, will have to be made. This distinction is important since the nature of a plan assumes that all of the resources of an action have already been identi ed, but the agents which could possibly perform some action have not. In this respect, a partial plan where the resources required (whatever they may be) have not yet been considered, cannot be represented.
It is also limiting in that two agents cannot perform the same action simultaneously. For example, the act of lifting a table might require two agents together performing a basic lift action. When reasoning about the multi-agent world in particular, where cooperation is likely to ensue, this seems a stringent restriction.
In addition, the notion of ownership in these external descriptions is not clear. We take it to mean that an agent owns another entity, if, for whatever the reason, that entity can be used for any action within its capabilities whenever the agent requires it. In other words, a resource in this formalism can be seen as a benevolent agent, adopting the goals of others' (to subsequently perform an action to satisfy those goals) whenever it can. Even then, however, there are further subtleties to consider. For example, many agents may own the same resource (such as a printer) but there is no mention of a shared resource. There may also be some degree of ownership in that my manager may always be able to use the printer before me, or some weaker notion of ownership like a desk in a shared o ce which can only be used by one of the occupants at a time. Clearly, a much richer notion of ownership is required. By contrast, the agent hierarchy allows us to be much clearer about the nature of these relationships which will depend on the type of entity and which goal dependence networks exist between the entities in the environment. If the entity required for some action is an object, then instantiating it as an agent is straightforward. If the entity is a non-autonomous agent, then the planning agent must reason about the nature of its agency further. (For example, can it share this agent? Can it persuade other agents that are currently engaging it to release it?) If the entity is an autonomous agent, then the planning agent will need to negotiate with the autonomous agent to persuade it to adopt its goal. More details of these social structures can be found in 9].
The hypothesis of external description compatibility ensures that any two agents will agree on the model of themselves and each other. Though the authors argue that there is no loss of generality, it is di cult to see how this can be so. A truly autonomous agent will have its own view of the world around it which may bear no relation to another agent's interpretation of its world. In general, we argue, any model of the world that an autonomous agent has of the world must be subjective. Certainly, a truly autonomous agent can never know the plans and goals of another agent; it may only infer them by evaluating the behaviour of the other agent. The authors themselves go some way along this path when they recognise in a later paper some of these di culties 13], but they still require an agent to have complete (and correct) knowledge of other agents' plans, for example, which is untenable.
In Section 5, we will provide a formal speci cation which allows for concurrent actions in a plan, an important requirement of general purpose multi-agent systems. We do not arbitrarily distinguish agents from resources, but instead consider agents with di erent functionalities. In this way we can provide a clearer and more intuitive representation of the social structures in the world since a planning agent would have to consider merely the set of agents that are required in a plan. Some of these agents might be invoked directly, some might be shared with some other agent, and some might be autonomous agents requiring negotiation. These ideas are developed further in 7].
De nitions of Autonomy
Using external descriptions, Sichman et al. distinguish three di erent forms of autonomy. An agent is a-autonomous for a given goal according to a set of plans of another to bring about that goal if there is a plan in this set that achieves the goal, and every action in each plan belongs to the capabilities of the agent. An agent is r-autonomous for a given goal according to a set of plans of another to bring about that goal if there is a plan in this set that achieves the goal, and every resource required by the plan is owned by the agent. An agent is s-autonomous for a given goal if it is both a-autonomous and r-autonomous.
In the following schema, we de ne these three classes of autonomy using of a new relation, achieves. The predicate, achieves (a; g; ps), holds precisely when an agent, a, has goal, g, and the non-empty set of plans associated with g in order to achieve it, is ps.
Thus in the schema below, the rst predicate states that an agent, a, is aautonomous with respect to some set of plans, ps, if and only if there is some agent, c, with goal, g, and plans, ps, to achieve g such that some plan, p in ps, contains actions all in the capabilities of a. Similar predicate are speci ed for r-autonomous and s-autonomous. Finally, the achieves predicate is speci ed as de ned above.
AutonomyRelations World aaut ; raut ; saut ; achieves : (Agent Goal Plan) 8 a : Agent; g : Goal; ps : Plan aaut (a; g; ps) , (9 c : Agent achieves (c;g; ps))( 9 p : ps (ran p (extdes a):capableof))r aut (a;g; ps) , (9 c : Agent achieves (c; g; ps))( 9p : ps (extdes a):resourcesofplan p (extdes a):ownedresources)ŝ aut (a; g; ps) , aaut (a;g; ps)^raut (a; g; ps)â chieves (a;g; ps) , g 2 (extdes a):goals( g; ps) 2 (extdes a):planforgoal^ps 6 = f g
In the de nition of achieves, the expression g 2 (extdes a):goals states that an agent can only reason with respect to a set of plans associated with a current goal (i.e. one that it desires). However, in the original description, there is ambiguity about whether this must be so. The mathematicalde nitions make no mention of whether this proviso is part of the mechanism. If we are guided by the examples given by Sichman, however, it would appear that this proviso is, in fact, included.
Using the formal framework ensures that we are precise and unambiguous about any de nitions presented within it. This is particularly important in this case, since whichever de nition is used has rami cations for social dependence network categorisations. This is explored more fully in section 4.4. According to these de nitions, if agents are autonomous, then they may not depend, for resources or actions, on other agents. Consequently, the fact that a pocket calculator has the resources and the actions necessary for adding some numbers makes it autonomous. (By contrast, we have argued elsewhere that autonomy is not simply action or resource dependence, but involves the ability to make one's own choices, to generate goals 8].) Nevertheless, these notions are useful to a motivated agent since in some motivational contexts, knowledge of the dependencies that exist between agents is important. They provide information as to when a goal can be satis ed (by performing the actions in a plan) without involving any other agents. Naturally, a planning agent may decide to pursue a plan that does involve others even if able to carry it out alone, for reasons of, for example, laziness, distribution of responsibility, e ciency, and so on.
Dependence Relations
Now we can consider the types of dependencies that exist between agents. An agent, A, a-depends on another agent, B, for a given goal, g, according to some set of plans of another to achieve g, if it has g as a goal, is not a-autonomous for g, and at least one action used in this plan is in B's capabilities. An agent, A, r-depends on another agent, B, for a given goal, g, according to some set of plans of another to achieve g, if it has g as a goal, is not r-autonomous for g, and at least one instantiation used in this plan is owned by B. An agent, A, s-depends on another agent, B, for a given goal, g, if it r-depends or a-depends on B.
The rst predicate in the schema below states that given two agents, a and b, a goal, g, and a set of plans according to which a is not a-autonomous with respect to g, a a-depends on b for g with respect to ps, if and only if there is some agent, c, with the goal, g, and plans to achieve g, ps, such that at least one plan in ps has an action in the capabilities of agent b. This reformulation also highlights some di culties. As stated earlier, at no point is it made clear whether two agents can share an action or a resource. Second, it makes little sense to say that I a-depend on an agent for some goal if the actions that achieve that goal are in my capabilities. Similarly, it also makes little sense to say that I r-depend on some agent for some resource if that resource is also owned by myself. A more intuitive de nition might be adep (a;b; g; ps) , (9 c : Agent achieves (c;g; ps)( 9x :
S fp : ps ran pg x 2 (extdes b):capableof^x = 2 (extdes a):capableof)) However, even when an agent is capable of some action of which I am not capable, and which I require for some plan, it again makes little sense to say there is a dependency. It is more appropriate to say that there is a possibility of that agent being able to help in achieving a goal. There is no doubt that such reasoning will be useful in certain situations. A better notion of actual dependency with respect to a goal, would be if every plan in the set of plans required some agent's assistance. In this respect there would be a real dependency on this agent in order to achieve the goal.
adep (a;b; g; ps) , (9 c : Agent achieves (c;g; ps)( 8 p : ps 9x : ran p x 2 (extdes b):capableof^x = 2 (extdes a):capableof))) These relations provide an agent with the structures that can be used to reason about others with a view to choosing an appropriate course of action in the context of its dependencies on others' goals, plans, resources, and so on.
Dependence Situations
Sichman proceeds to use these relations to classify distinct dependency relations which arise. This subsection considers these situations. We must rst note that there is an ambiguity between Sichman's mathematical and textual descriptions of dependency 12]. In the mathematical description, the dependency refers to any set of plans which any agent has, but the textual description refers only to the plans of the reasoning agent. In the interpretation that follows, we adopt the more restrictive version since it is consistent with the given notions of independence and unilateral dependence discussed later, and is more intuitive in re ecting the nature of autonomous agents. (We might equally have chosen the other alternative, however.)
Consider the situation where we have two agents, A and B, where A is not a-autonomous for some goal, g 1 , according to A's plans, ps 1 , to achieve g 1 . We can then recognise the following situations.
A is independent with respect to B for g 1 if, according to ps 1 , it infers that it does not a-depend on B for g 1 .
A is unilaterally dependent on B if, according to ps 1 , A a-depends on B, but there is no goal for which B a-depends on A. Two agents are mutually dependent if they a-depend on each other for the same goal g 1 according to ps 1 .
If, in addition, B is not a-autonomous for some goal, g 2 , according to A's plans to achieve g 2 then we can also write the following.
Two agents are reciprocally dependent if they a-depend on each other for two di erent goals, g 1 and g 2 , according to two sets of plans, ps 1 These de nitions would be more sensible if they were based on dependencies for actions which an agent does not have. For example, if A is independent of B, it implies that there is no way that B could help A in performing an action. A more intuitive de nition of independence would be that A does not need B.
Consider the de nition of mutual dependence between A and B. It states that A and B both have a goal g 1 , and according to A's plans to achieve g 1 , there is some plan in which B could perform an action, and some plan (not necessarily the same plan) in which A could perform an action. What this categorisation describes is a potential for cooperation. A more intuitive de nition of mutual dependence would be that every plan in the set needs both agents.
Reciprocal dependence occurs when, according to two sets of plans, A could help B achieve some goal g1, and B could help A achieve some goal g2. However, since the de nition is with respect to A's plans, if we assume that agents can only reason with respect to sets of plans associated with a desired goal (as suggested by the authors), it must be that A currently desires both goals g 1 and g 2 . This is very restrictive since it rules out the possibility of bargaining when A has only one goal, for example, and B has only one other goal. In such a case, both agents may then help each other by adopting the other's goals.
The mechanism is described as social exchange, and the authors state that \one of them will have to adopt the other's goal rst in order to achieve his own one in the future". As we have seen in one interpretation of this mechanism, A must necessarily have both goals, so this scenario is inappropriate. Even then, it is too restrictive since both plans may be carried out concurrently.
Local and Mutual Belief
The dependencies described above can be locally or mutually believed. A dependence is local if it only exists with respect to A's plans but not with respect to B's, and it is mutual if it occurs with respect to both A's and B's plans. DependencySituationsLocalandMutual DependencySituations lbmd ; mbmd : (Agent Agent Goal) lbrd ; mbrd : (Agent Agent Goal Goal) 8 a; b : Agent; g1; g2 : Goal; ps1; ps2; ps3; ps4 : Plan j a 6 = b^g1 6 = g2^achieves (a;g1; ps1)^achieves (a; g2; ps2)â chieves (b; g1; ps3)^achieves (b; g2; ps4)^: aaut (a;g1; ps1) lbmd (a; b; g1) ,md (a; b; g1; ps1)^: md (a; b; g1; ps3)m bmd (a;b; g1) , md (a;b; g1; ps1)^md (a; b; g1; ps3)l brd (a; b; g1; g2) , rd (a;b; g1; g2; ps1; ps2)^: rd (a;b; g1; g2; ps3; ps4)m brd (a; b; g1; g2) , rd (a;b; g1; g2; ps1; ps2)^rd (a;b; g1; g2; ps3; ps4) More problems arise here, too. Notice, in particular, that both local and mutual belief require an analysis of both A's and B's plans, thus contradicting the following claim:
\An agent locally believes a given dependence if he uses exclusively his own plans when reasoning about the others : : : " 12] In a subsequent paper, the authors drop the hypothesis of external description compatibility and instead concentrate on how they might detect agency level inconsistency resulting from two agents having di erent external description entries regarding each other 13]. However, it is also noticeable that their de nition of mutually believed mutual dependence (MBMD) bears little relation to that proposed in the earlier paper 12]. The later de nition is as follows: \As an example, if i infers a MBMD between himself and j for a certain goal g, this means he believes that (i) both of them have this goal and at least one plan to achieve it (ii) there is an action needed in this plan that he can perform and j can not perform (iii) there is an action needed in this plan that j can perform and he can not perform. " 13] But the mathematical de nition provides a di erent account of mutually believed mutual dependence: A and B both have goal g; according to A's plans A and B are not a-autonomous with respect to g; according to B's plans A and B are not a-autonomous with respect to g; there is some plan of A's which contains an action which B can do and a plan (possibly the same) which contains an action which A can do, and there is some plan of B's which contains an action which A can do and a plan (possibly the same) which contains an action which B can do.
In particular, the mathematical de nition is not given in terms of an action not being in some agent's capabilities and, further, there is no mention of a particular plan within the set of plans, as required by the textual description above. This is precisely the kind of inconsistency we hope to avoid by specifying the mechanism formally within our framework, since we are then able to provide a uni ed and complete account of a system.
In the same paper 13], the authors do not assume the hypothesis of external description compatibility but state the following. \For simplicity, let us consider that the plans of the agents are the same and both of them know the plans of the other."
Consequently, there can be agent level consistency in terms of what agents believe about the capabilities, resources and goals of each other, assuming they know the plans of every agent. This is evidently very useful, even though severely limiting, and further work explores agent reasoning about this class of problem.
A New Proposal
In this section we brie y describe a new proposal for external descriptions which allows for true autonomy (in the sense that an agent can never know the goals, actions and plans of another), simultaneous actions, active and non-active goals and plans, partial plans and a richer understanding of the social relationship between the entities in the world. In this respect, we can re-formulate the useful work of social dependence networks within a well-de ned formal framework for agency and autonomy.
Consider xing a screw into a block of wood. According to our hierarchical framework, this may require two agents: a screwdriver, and someone with the ability to use the screwdriver, both agents performing an action simultaneously. Every action in a plan must either be associated with the entity intended to to perform the action, or be associated with no entity if the entity involved in its instantiation has not yet been chosen.
In the following example, we illustrate our new representation of a plan for use in external descriptions. It consists of an action which I will perform, followed by two actions performed by two entities simultaneously, followed by three actions performed simultaneously by three entities (including one by me), followed by some action to be performed by an as yet unknown entity.
hf(a1;fmeg)g; f(a2 1 ; fentity1g);(a2 2 ; fentity2g)g; f(a3 1 ; fmeg);(a3 2 ; fentity2g);(a3 3 ; fentity4g)g; f(a4;fg)gi A plan, therefore, has the following new type.
NewPlan == seq ( (Action ( Entity)))
The schema below speci es an external description which includes the current goals of an agent. Associated with each such goal are a set of plans which together form the set of current plans. In addition, we also de ne the set of all goals of an agent | some of which are currently desired and some of which are not | and the corresponding set of all plans. (Note that in this respect we can be clear about categorisations based on certain types of plans, goals and so on.)
In addition, we de ne three useful but redundant variables which for each plan return the set of action-entity pairs, actions, and entities involved in the plan, respectively. The last predicate ensures that given an action-entity pair in a plan where the entity is de ned, the action must be in the capabilities of the entity. 6 
Conclusions
Social Dependence Networks are a valuable source of information about the relationships within a multi-agent world, and provide the necessary structure that can be exploited by agents in order to function e ectively. They allow agents to reason about resources and capabilities of others in order that they may enter into a negotiation to persuade these others to assist them in completing their tasks. This paper has described the work of Sichman et al. in developing computational models of dependence networks and has reformulated it in another, formal, framework. By reformulating it in these terms, we have been able to identify de ciencies in the original characterisation of dependence networks and the external descriptions of agents within the networks. We have addressed these de ciencies, and o er a modi ed view of external descriptions which removes much of the ambiguity and presents a stronger and more consistent, formal model which can easily be extended to de ne social dependence networks.
In reformulating dependence networks in this way, we have also presented a case study which shows how the formal framework that we have previously developed can be applied to provide an environment in which we can describe and reason about theories and models of MAS. Moreover, we have highlighted inconsistencies and ambiguities, and outlined how such models may be incorporated within our framework.
A Introduction to Z
The formal speci cation language Z is based on set theory, rst order logic and predicate calculus. It extends the use of these languages by allowing an additional mathematical type known as the schema type. Z schemas have two parts: the upper, declarative, part which declares variables and their types, and the lower, predicate, part which relates and constrains those variables. The type of any schema can be considered as the cartesian product of the types of each of its variables, without any notion of order, but constrained by predicates. Modularity is facilitated in Z by allowing schemas to be included within other schemas. We can select a state variable, var, of a schema, schema, by writing schema:var.
To introduce a type in Z, where we wish to abstract away from the actual content of elements of the type, we use the notion of a given set. We may write NODE to represent the set of all nodes. If we wish to state that a variable takes on some set of values or an ordered pair of values we write x : NODE; x : NODE NODE, respectively. The generic functions rst and second return the rst element and second element of any ordered pair, respectively. A relation type expresses some relationship between two existing types, known as the source and target type. When no element from the source type can be related to two or more elements from the target type, the relation is a function. A total function (") is one where every element in the source set is related, while a partial function ( ) is where not every element in the source is related. Finally, A sequence (seq)is a special type of function where the domain is the contiguous set of numbers from 1 up to the number of elements in the sequence. For example, consider the following function which de nes a relation between nodes: Rel = f(node1; node2); (node2; node3); (node3; node2); (node4; node4)g.
The domain (dom) of a relation or function is those elements in the source set which are related, and the range (ran) is those elements in the target set which are related. In this case dom Rel = fnode1; node2; node3; node4g and ran Rel = fnode2; node3; node4g.
Sets of elements can be de ned using set comprehension. For example, the following expression denotes the set of squares of natural numbers greater than 10 fx : j x > 10 x xg. The way to write down predicates in Z is nonstandard. To state that, say, any number greater than 10 has a square greater than 100, we write: 8 n : j n > 10 n n > 100.
Lastly, we make use of mapseq, which takes a function and a sequence and applies the function to each element of the sequence and mapset, which takes a function and a set and applies the function to each element of the set. 
